boasting only a feeble substance in the Union context, be it justice, 5 democracy, 6 or equality, 7 this should be put straight: the presumption of importance of EU citizenship duties should be dismissed once and for all. To do this is the core ambition of this paper.
Unlike a myriad scholars claiming that, to quote J.H.H. Weiler, 'la cultura dei diritti, che lo si voglia o no, indebolisce alquanto la contro-cultura della reponsabilità e del dovere' 8 this article demonstrates that duties of EU citizenship only exist as one word in the Treaty, which does not happen to correspond to anything in either contemporary legal theory or in practice: both theory and day-to-day reality mandate a conclusion that there is simply no 'contro-cultura' which is at the centre of the regrets, expressed in current mainstream scholarship, which is most likely mistaken. 9 Moreover, the fact that there is no such 'contro-cultura' is a good thing, unlike what all the scholars listed in footnote three and their numerous associates claim.
Crucially, this situation is not specific to EU citizenship and boasts multiple parallels at the Member State level, where duties have been in marked recess during the last half a century at least. Speaking of citizenship duties, 10 scholars fail to take the duty' 13 -cannot be simply assumed: legal theory moved on. 14 Scholars attempting to import this orthodoxy into EU citizenship field failed to seriously scrutinize this untenable assumption. 15 Given the overwhelming consensus among scholars that even the would-be duty to obey the law -often presented as the core of citizenship -as such is deprived of any ethical foundation, 16 it becomes clear that the story of citizenship duties, is not alone, let alone exceptional: all duties-oriented thinking might be in decline 17 in contemporary rights-based secular legal culture. 18 While it is undeniable that codes of conduct can be equally successful, either based on rights, or duties, 19 there is a reason behind opting for rights as the starting point. 26 The most presumed citizenship duty in the context of EU law seems to be the unwritten duty to move or otherwise fall within the scope of EU law in order to benefit in full from all the rights provided by the Union legal system. Rather than an unwritten citizenship duty, however, the current reality where EU citizenship needs at times to be activated by the use of rights provided by the EU level is an anomaly related to the legal-historical approach to drawing the vertical boundary between the two legal orders in the EU, rather than a duty of citizenship. Viewed as such, it is more comparable to being present in the territory of the state in order to be protected by its police force. It is impossible to claim that a Dutchmen in Angola has a duty to move to Amsterdam in order to be protected by the Dutch With the duties the picture is drastically different: the Treaty does not in fact mention a single one. Scholars trying to find any are bound to concede that implied unwritten legal duties are hardly enforceable and, most likely, would be a bad idea.
We are told that the Union does not command enough allegiance to impose duties, of duties is a soluble problem and the duties will come, 39 even listing some examples, such as 'the duty to obey the law; the duty to participate in the defence of one's polity; the duty to pay tax; the duty to seek employment; and a duty to vote'. 40 In other words, among the numerous duties offered as likely entrants on the stage of EU law, the majority are confused misrepresentations of the idea. Such duties as to pay taxes, or abide by the law are of general application concerning all, no matter citizens or not, and can thus hardly be branded as citizenship duties. A duty to work or otherwise contribute to society cannot be proclaimed without cynicism when unemployment rates in some Member States reach 20% or more and when sad examples are at hand where the enforcement of such duties drove Nobel Prize winning poets to a Siberian exile. 41 And the duty to be proud of the Union and respect its values largely comes down to mongering thick allegiances which -besides an obvious point that one cannot be ordered to love and be passionate out of a rulers' volition -also threatens all what the Union has achieved to date, in terms of liberation from indoctrination which reins at the national level: an attempted move, in Allott's words, from "diplomacy" to "democracy". 42 In short, EU citizenship duties do not exist. Moreover, it is not a problem at all. Rather, it is an asset for the Union legal system, which is much less unique, however, than it might seem.
The lack of duties at EU level reflects a general evolution of the relationship between the governing and the governed, which develops in a similar vein also at the 54 We are witnessing a total shift of the border between persons and citizens in Constitutional thought. 55 In the context of the on-going transformation two important functions of citizenship duties come to light. Unlike the common perception among observers today, the main function of citizenship duties in the past was an exclusionary one:
duties were relied upon to outline second-class citizens -such as persons of colour, women, the poor, 56 the weak, and, crucially for the democratic outcomes, political dissenters -in order to justify their full exclusion from the actual benefits that the legal status of citizenship which they formally possessed was supposed to provide to 
III. Obedience and theory
Citizenship plays an important role at both EU and national levels. This is mostly due to the concept of rights and is not disturbed by whatever is going on with the duties of citizenship. Consequently, approaching the matter empirically, there is no correlation between duties and citizenship. Moreover, given the emerging scholarly consensus that the moral duty to obey the law, including the hypothetical duties of citizenship, cannot be possibly justified, the moral worth of citizenship duties is nihil: compliance -just as non-compliance -with whatever the authority demands of you does not make you a worse or a better person in moral terms. In this context, there is simply no place for the glorification of diligently complacent citizens, let alone making the duties of citizenship the measure of the concept's success, as numerous scholars seemed to suggest. Indeed, following Isin, ignoring the proclaimed duties can be just as worthy an act of citizenship as respecting them.
To agree with Joppke, the reality itself 'exposes as empty rhetoric the ritual notion that citizenship rests on a "balance of obligations and rights"'. 20 obligations 74 (the latter correlative to rights, but voluntarily assumed). 75 The fact remains, following H.L.A. Hart, that all these notions actually come from 'different segments of morality, concern different conduct, and make different types of moral criticism and evaluation'. 76 The correlation between rights and duties, blurring all these divides, is thus particularly unhelpful, especially given that rights, essentially, are not negative claims on others, as Waldron has shown. 77 To establish that a right corresponds to a duty is to ignore that it can also correspond to simply having no right. 78 The misleading nature of duties and rights pairing has long being recognized in the literature. 79 Feinberg provides a fine illustration: 'we commonly enough hear talk of "owing obedience" to parents, police officers, and bosses, and these authorities In framing citizenship and rights opposing a citizen to a State is not enough, it seems: the landscape of our interactions is much more complex, involving a strong social element which does not overlap with what the state offers. 85 There is no reason it seems, to equate citizenship with all the social aspects of our lives, since a society as such cannot possibly be based on state-supplied blessings and confirmations of someone's legal status. To the contrary, a society is a social fact -it exists and is observable in crude reality and necessarily involves citizens and non-citizens alike.
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Speaking about societal obligations in the language of citizenship duties is misleading and should not be done, just as forging obligations out of voluntary activities, which is outright absurd.
The fact that citizenship duties are not necessarily correlated to rights in theory is in direct relation with the general lack of moral foundations that would require obedience to the law. Moral duties as such have very difficult time in contemporary legal theory. The matter is not confined to citizenship duties in any way. Indeed, there is a virtually universal consensus in the legal-philosophical literature that the moral duty to obey the law does not and cannot possibly exist. It is obvious that such a duty cannot be taken for a self-standing legal principle, since, to agree with Rawls, it would be highly artificial to imply that 'when we find ourselves subject to an existing system of rules satisfying the definition of a legal system, we have an obligation to obey the law'. 88 A number of arguments has been raised by thinkers throughout the centuries in favour of such a duty, based on different moral-philosophical considerations, but all of them gradually came to be dismissed. 89 Indeed, to agree with Ladd, it seems like such externalist theories (i.e.
presuming that the duty to obey the law comes from a non-legal source) are of little utility in justifying the obligation to obey the law. 90 The same, however, holds for the internalist theories, which take the law as an intrinsically moral conception: it is not, to which innumerable examples of repugnant or unjust laws going against the common or individual good or making no sense at all, testify. This is why justifications of a requirement to obey the law, which are external to the legal system as such, tend to receive much more attention from legal philosophers. by those who -absurdly -believe that the system in place is the best we can possibly aspire for, even if we believe that gratitude of the powerless to the powerful is not misplaced.
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IV. EU law and national citizenship duties
The situation with citizenship duties is such, that there is a clearly decipherable trend of moving away from duties-inspired rhetoric and law, since the functions of uniformisation and discrimination that duties have been traditionally playing are of no use anymore for the modern democracies. The lack of a legal-philosophical ground for being serious about duties makes the arguments of those favouring a duty-based approach to citizenship even less appealing, particularly when not only the general duties-rights correlation, but also the moral duty to obey the law as such are not there. 118 This kind of development is not contrary, but is in fact fully in line with a general trend in citizenship evolution described by Joppke, which co-accommodates increasing objective with decreasing subjective value of citizenship.
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V. Conclusion
Basing a legal system on rights, rather than duties, is not an arbitrary choice: it reflects the essential assumption that people should be free, which also includes freedom to determine the meaning of right and wrong, failure and success etc. in the context of the personal projects they pursue -a gift of freedom unthinkable in a system of preexisting prescriptions which necessarily underlie the concept of duties. Should citizenship be pared with freedom, there is no place for duties within the auspices of this concept. This is exactly what we observed in the context of citizenship's evolution. There has never been any 'shortage of sheep-like subjects' 120 that the dutyoriented vision of citizenship promotes. Yet, active engagement and the reshaping of the right and wrong in any given context, including a supranational Union, necessarily requires a rights-based approach to membership.
This article confined itself to making five interrelated points. 1.There are no empirically-observable duties of EU citizenship; 2.Such duties would lack any legaltheoretical foundation, if the contrary were true; 3.Legal-theoretical foundations of the duties of citizenship are lacking also at the Member State level; 4.EU law plays an important role in undermining the ability of the Member States where residual duties remain, to enforce them; 5.This development is part of a greater EU input into the strengthening of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in the Member States, also reflecting an important general trend in law's development. In the light of these findings it is unquestionable that there is no room for EU citizenship duties in the edifice of EU law.
